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Political Apathy in Poland
 
David Mason and Daniel N. Nelson· 
Strikes in Poland during April and May 1988 demonstrate 
once again the stalemate confronting regime and populace. 
Although Jaruzelski cannot mobilize support for economic 
reforms, Solidarity also lacks the power to force the regime 
toward the political reforms it deems necessary for Poland's 
salvation. 
A widespread sense of political apathy, we think, 
accounts for this stalemate. Poles are tired of politics, tired of 
Jaruzelski, and tired even of Solidarity. The exhilaration of 
Solidarity's sixteen months, followed by the depression of 
martial law, has turned the society even more sharply away 
from the regime, and away from politics, than was the case 
before 1980. While a small minority continues to support 
Solidarity, most people are doubtful that Solidarity can 
achieve anything at this point, and many fear that a return to 
power by the trade union would lead to social unrest and 
further economic collapse. An even smaller minority supports 
the regime. This leaves a broad middle of the population 
consisting of people who are uninterested in politics, and who 
do not participate in politics, either legally or illegally. This 
broad spectrum of Poles is, in other words, apathetic. 
Political apathy is characterized by a lack of 
psychological involvement in public affairs, emotional 
detachment from civic obligation, and abstention from 
political activity. When people cease to care about political 
life, withdraw from obligations to civil society, and perform 
entirely nominal or rote acts -- or none at all -- in political 
institutions or organizations, apathy is indicated. 
Low Psychological Involvement 
We interpret "psychological involvement" primarily as 
awareness of politics, interest in politics, attention to the 
media, and information about politics. 
Although Leninist party regimes spare little in their 
attempt to socialize and mobilize the populations, Poles do not 
evince a substantial awareness of even major political issues 
and events. During the Gierek years, less than 20 percent of 
the residents of six cities could name the president, the first 
party secretary, or a single representative in their electoral 
district. The official Center for Public Opinion Research 
(OBOP), found as well that 70 percent of their respondents 
asserted that they could not understand what was happening in 
politics. Information about elections is also minimal. While 
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about 75 percent of the nationwide survey Polacy '84 (poles 
'84) correctly identified the councils for which elections were 
being held in June 1984, only 57 percent were entirely correct 
in their responses. In a survey among young people, 
knowledge of concepts associated with ideology was lower 
than one might expect -- only 44 percent could identify 
"historical materialism," for example (Radio Free Europe 
Research [RFER], June 5, 1986). 
During the brief period of Solidarity's open activity, and 
for some months after martial law, the levels of political 
interest and activity were extraordinarily high. The 
environment of martial law began, however, to depress both 
interest and activity. Less than four years after Solidarity was 
crushed, survey results published in the official weekly 
Polityka found only 15-17 percent of adult citizens who were 
"interested in politics," about half of whom were party 
members. Other research in 1985 saw in public opinion an 
increasing "disinclination toward efforts to change the 
political status quo," and attitudes of "discouragement and 
expectation." More people were unwilling or unable to 
express political opinions one way or the other, contributing to 
the growth of a "silent minority" estimated to have reached a 
third of adults by the mid-1980s (Polacy '84). 
Solidarity and the political opposition generally have 
been affected, too. According to Polacy •84, fewer and fewer 
people identified themselves as having belonged to Solidarity 
in 1981, from 37 percent in 1981 to 22 percent in the fall of 
1985. Since Solidarity was declared illegal, some of the 
decline may be fear of being linked to such a non-sanctioned 
organization. Yet, both official and unofficial polls show 
declining support for, and confidence in the opposition. By 
1985, only about 11 percent expressed confidence in the 
Solidarity underground and only about 20 percent were 
"sympathetic" to the political opposition (Polityka February 1, 
1986). Even among Solidarity activists, "the underground 
opposition" is rated favorably by a bare majority of the 
respondents to a survey by Slowo Podziemne (Underground 
Word) in 1984. These kinds of attitudes led the underground 
publication Mysli Nieinternowane (Uninterned Thoughts) to 
observe that "society is not with us, nor is it with the 
authorities -- it is keeping 10 itself." 
Detachment from Civic Obligations 
Low psychological involvement in the system is 
accompanied by a detachment from civic obligations, reduced 
concern for ideological and societal goals, a decline in civic 
pride, and a retreat into private life. While all of these 
phenomena were present, and probably on the rise in the 
1970s, they are even more evident in the post-Solidarity 
period. Janusz Reykowski attempted to explain the problem 
in Polityka (April 6, 1985): 
certain major social groups... consider the social order 
here to be unjust [and} at the same lime inefficient as 
regards ensuring economic progress. They do not feel 
any solidarity with the state in its present form. They 
approach it from detached positions and sympathize with 
those who actively oppose it. 
Although disaffection with the regime is more widespread 
than support for the opposition, Reykowski accurately notes 
the roots of alienation in the popular perception that the 
regime had failed both politically and economically. In 1985, 
the official Center for Research on Social Opinion (CBOS) 
reported that fully two-thirds of the population thinks that the 
government's policies will not help the country emerge from 
the economic crisis. 
Consequently, a mood of futility and detachment has 
become generalized. The columnist "Kisiel" [Stefan 
Kisielewski -- Editors] in the Catholic weekly Tygodnik 
Powszechny (Universal Weekly) (April 22,29, 1984) 
characterized this sentiment as, "all 1 want is for them to 
please leave me in peace." A desire for ".. .inner peace, 
enabling one to focus on the most important things, on 
problems of life and death... " has become commonplace. 
Concomitant with the rising sentiments of futility, all 
institutions, official or not, suffered a decline in trust from 
1981 to 1984. The three most trusted institutions in 1981 all 
showed substantial declines: the Church from 94 to 82 
percent, Solidarity from 91 percent to 13 percent and the army 
from 89 percent to 65 percent (Mason, Public Opinion and 
Political Change in Poland, 1980-1982, 1985; Polacy '84). 
Trust in individuals in public life was not much higher. Pope 
John Paul 11 was far and away the most trusted, by 97 percent, 
and Jozef Glemp, the Primate of the Polish Catholic Church, 
was second with 81 percent. According to this survey, the 
most highly trusted official figure was party leader Wojciech 
Jaruzelski, a distant third with 54 percent. No other person, 
official or unofficial (even Lech Walesa) was trusted by more 
than half of the population. 
While the lack of support for official institutions may be 
disturbing and is galling for the regime, the decline in the 
legitimacy of the state and the political ideals of the 
government is even more destabilizing, perhaps even 
dangerous (Nelson, Social Science Quarterly, September, 
1986). Historically, even in difficult times, and even during 
Solidarity, most Poles expressed support for at least the idea 
of socialism, complaining only that the reality of Poland did 
not accord with the ideals. Youth surveys conducted in 1977 
showed 78 percent supporting the proposition that "the world 
ought to develop in the direction of socialism." When the 
same question was asked in 1983, however, only 43 percent 
supported the idea. Other surveys since then have shown even 
further declines in support for socialism and socialist 
principles among young people, and a dramatic decline in the 
number of young people identifying themselves as Marxists. 
Particularly for the central Manist value of egalitarianism, 
until recently accepted widely in Poland, there has been a 
sharp decline of support since 1980. 
As an extension of the diminished affect for the existing 
institutions and values, there is also a broader disenchantment 
with Poland's entire post-war history. A political "model" 
based on centralization and domination by a single party is 
supported by "not more than a fifth of the adult population" 
(Polacy '84). And, by 1984, only 56 percent thought Poland's 
accomplishments after 1945 could be assessed as positive 
(Zycie Warszawy [Warsaw Life], December 5, 1984), down 
from 75-85 percent in the 1970s. 
A retreat into private affairs, the family, and religion 
accounts for much of such detachment from civic affairs. 
Particularly among young people, there is a sense of 
helplessness, isolation and apathy manifested in "an 
overwhelming and increasing passivity on the part of most 
young people who, tormented by futile anger, turn away from 
the pressure of schools and organizations and seek refuge in 
individualism and in the passivity and exclusiveness of small 
groups of friends" (Tu, Teraz [Here, Now], September 15, 
1984). The same phenomenon, noted by official pollsters in 
the weekly Polityka , is seen as a "...retreat to privacy 
according to the principle'everyone for himself. ,,, 
Political Inactivity 
Low levels of psychological involvement and detachment 
from the civic culture have also resulted in very low levels of 
political activity. Communist party regimes have always, of 
course, sought widespread, but nominal, involvement of the 
population in public organizations and rituals (such as voting 
and May Day parades), to produce a stratum of involved 
citizens one might evocatively call "fillers." In post-martial 
law Poland, however, citizens do, in fact, boycott officially 
sanctioned organizations and activities. 
The most dramatic changes of this kind have taken place 
in national parliamentary elections. Before Solidarity, 
according to official figures, 98-99 percent of eligible citizens 
voted in the Sejm elections; such results are typical throughout 
the communist bloc. In March 1980, the last election before 
Solidarity, 98.87 percent participated. Elections scheduled for 
1984 were postponed until the next year. A new electoral law 
that allows, among other changes, two candidates for most 
seats failed to attract public interest. The Warsaw daily Zycie 
Warszawy observed that public debate about the law was 
marked by "social apathy and an absence of any wide public 
interest. .. 
The focus of the election campaign became, for both the 
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regime and the opposition, not the candidates themselves but 
the number of people that would vote. In the 1984 peoples' 
council elections, the authorities claimed 75 percent of 
registered voters had voted; the opposition, which had 
conducted its own monitoring (by watching polling stations 
from adjoining apartments, for example) of the elections, 
claimed a much lower turnout -- 60 percem. For 1985, both 
sides hoped to improve the participation/boycott figures. The 
results of the election were a modest victory for the 
government, with official returns showing a 79 percent turnout 
and Solidarity claiming 66 percent, but both figures were 
higher than the corresponding ones for 1984. This "victory" 
for the government was hollow since the turnout was far lower 
than ever before in Poland or, for that matter, in any other 
communist state. 
Even smaller proportions of the population exhibit 
knowledge about, and interest in politics. In 1979, researchers 
concluded (even then) that "people understand 'political life' 
as a subject of information and commentary, but not as an 
arena for their own participation." People talk about politics, 
but they don't participate in it (Ryszka, Zmiany w 
Swiadorrwsci Politycznej Polakow, 1985). This tendency 
became even more widespread after the Solidarity period. At 
a Warsaw party committee session in 1984, it was revealed 
that over 70 percent of workers surveyed in the capital were 
not interested in becoming involved with any official 
organization inside or outside of the factories (RFER, 
February 19, 1985). 
A steady decline in the Polish United Workers' Party 
(pUWP) membership from 3.1 million in 1980 to only 2.1 
million in 1985 has been parallel to the larger diminution in 
political interest. It will be difficult to raise party membership 
in the future; only 11 percent of the members are under 30 
years old, the lowest percentage in the party's history. 
Officially sponsored youth organizations have also lost much 
of their membership since 1980, and only a fraction of people 
aged 16-28 belong to any of the regime's youth groups 
(RFER, October 12, 1984). As a prominent sociologist noted 
in the September 1, 1987 issue of Odrodzenie (Renewal), 
students now have "more calm and balanced" views of the 
events of 1980-81, but "these more balanced judgments are 
not being accompanied by the desire to actively participate in 
the country's socio-politicallife." 
New trade unions, constituted in 1982 to succeed 
Solidarity, have acquired more resources, and now include 
about six million members. While this is probably better than 
Jaruzelski expected, it is less than half of the pre-Solidarity 
branch unions total of 12 million members; Solidarity, itself, 
attracted about nine million. There is, as well, a noticeable 
lack of enthusiasm for the new unions. A CBOS survey in 
1984 revealed that, even among members of the trade unions, 
only 37 percent expressed confidence in them. 
"Social consultations" -- regime sponsored grass-roots 
meetings to discuss forthcoming events or decisions -- have 
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also been tried to elicit controlled partlclpation. Such 
consultations were held to evoke opinions (and support) for 
the new Sejm (parliamentary) electoral law, and there were 
also "consultations" between Sejm candidates and their 
constituents as the election approached. But when the Polacy 
'84 pollsters asked about participation in such consultations, 
the results were abysmally low: only 5.2 percent participated 
in the consultations on prices (actually price increases), 8.7 
percent on the electoral law, and 6.8 percent on the wage 
system. In November 1987, only 67 percent of eligible voters 
participated in a referendum on the government's economic 
reform. While a majority of those approved the plans, the 
comparatively low turnout prevented the regime from winning 
approval from a majority of all voters, as required by law. 
Low levels of participation in official activities does not 
translate into high levels of activity in support of the 
opposition. While the Solidarity underground continues to 
operate, probably with several tens of thousands of activists, 
the opposition can no longer count on the large numbers who 
were willing to protest and demonstrate in the first year or two 
of martial law. A combination of rigorous, sometimes brutal, 
police repression of such demonstrations, and increasing 
popular fatigue and frustration with them, has led to a 
considerable drop-off in the numbers who will engage in such 
activities. This was dramatized during the strikes in April and 
May of 1988, when even in the enterprises that were 
Solidarity strongholds in 1980-81, most of the workers 
abstained from joining the strikers, or drifted away from the 
strike after a few days. 
As noted above, both official and underground polls show 
that less than half the population provides even vocal or moral 
support for the opposition. According to the Polacy '84 
survey, only 39 percent of the population favors legalizing the 
activities "of groups and organizations of an oppositional 
character," while an equal number opposed such an idea. 
Even fewer are willing to actually engage in public protest. A 
1984 underground poll on opposition strategy (among 
Solidarity supporters) showed only 30 percent favoring street 
demonstrations and 21 percent supporting strike actions 
(S/owo Podziemne, May 27, 1984). As another underground 
publication observed, "the emotions and spontaneous protest" 
are now burnt out" (Mysli Nieintemowane, January-February, 
1984). 
Causes of Apathy in Poland 
The wrenching, exhilarating and depressing political 
experiences of Poland since 1980 undoubtedly explain a good 
deal of the apathy we have described. But, as we have seen, 
the roots of these sentiments extend back prior to Solidarity, 
and seem certain to remain part of the Polish experience for 
years to come. The popular sense of alienation and apathy are 
also based on feelings of pessimism and hopelessness. 
inefficacy, cynicism (especially with the perceived distance 
between ideals and reality), and the continuing day-to-day 
economic problems. 
Pessimism is everywhere in Poland; one is hard pressed to 
fmd an optimist in that country, even among officials and 
party members. This pessimism is revealed in many surveys 
as well. Most Poles believe that the current "crisis" began in 
the 1970s, and will continue for many more years. In an 
official CBOS poll in late 1984, three-quarters of the 
respondents thought that Poland had not yet "exited" from the 
crisis. Furthermore, the prognoses for the situation were not 
very bright. Only about a third of the sample thought that, 
within the next five years, there would be a lessening of 
societal distrust toward the authorities or a democratization of 
political life. The rest thought these situations would not 
change, or even worsen. Such feelings are even more 
widespread among young people: only 4-8 percent believe 
conditions will improve in the near future; a half think they 
will get worse (RFER, June 5, 1986). Given these extremely 
pessimistic expectations, it is not surprising that Poles have 
turned away from public affairs. 
This pessimism contributes to, and is in tum compounded 
by, a sense of political inefficacy. People feel they have little 
influence on matters either at the national level or in their 
immediate slUToundings. In a late 1983 poll, 72 percent felt 
that their social group had little or nO influence on matters 
affecting the country. When asked "who clUTently rules in 
Poland?" only 5.8 percent answered "the working class." As 
the sociologist Witold Morawski put it, the main reason for 
the "ineffectiveness of the system" is the "prevalence of LOp­
down mobilization mechanisms over mechanisms of 
articulation from below" which means that "the interests and 
values of society are not sufficiently recognized in the 
political and economic system." For many Poles, this lack of 
opportunity for political input is particularly galling given the 
very different message conveyed by the official ideology. As 
Wladyslaw Adamski noted in the introduction to the Polacy 
'84 survey, "the source of social conflict in Poland is the 
discrepancy between the aspirations and interests of society 
and the character of the political system and the effectiveness 
of the economy." 
The continuing economic problems contributed to the 
sense of depression and fatigue, and left people with little time 
or inclination to be involved in politics. By 1988, rationing 
had been in place for seven years. Meanwhile, prices 
continued to rise, while wages did not keep up. By 1983,21 
percent of working families lived below the poverty line 
(defined as lWo-thirds of average income), compared to 17 
percent in 1982 (Tygodnik Powszechny, January 6,1985). The 
situation was further worsened by the widespread and steep 
price increases imposed by the regime in early 1988 as part of 
its economic reform program. 
Public opinion on the economy is as negative as it is 
regarding the political system, and pessimism is increasing 
every year. In 1984,33 percent said the economy was "poor"; 
in 1985, 38 percent made the same assessment, and by 1986, 
51 percent felt that way. Further, only 10 percent believe the 
economic refonn program has much chance of improving the 
situation (Kwiatkowski, Po/ityka March 21, 1987). As 
political observers from deTocqueville on have noted, 
political activism and revolutionary ferment occurs not when 
economic conditions are at their worst, but after a period of 
some improvement In Poland the perception, at least, is that 
there has been no improvement. 
To some extenl, the depoliticization of the population has 
been caused by the regime, either intentionally or 
unintentionally. In the aftermath of the participatory 
revolution of Solidarity, the martial law authorities 
temporarily prohibited all political and organizational activity, 
and eventually banned a nwnber of organizations that had 
been born or revitalized during 1980-81. They also attempted 
to deflect the workers from political activity, promising an 
improvement in the economy and a more stable environment 
The regime even attempted to buy off certain strategically 
located groups .- coal miners, for example -- by offering them 
large wage increases and expanded fringe benefits. From the 
regime's point of view, political apathy was beuer than 
political opposition. Ironically, the country's official 
institutions have been victimized by the government's success 
in moving the population away from political activity. 
Prohibited from joining the organizations of their choice, the 
workers now refuse to partieipate in those the party chooses. 
Implications and Conclusions 
Several dimensions of political apathy, and conditions 
that we expect contribute to such a phenomenon, are thus 
present in Poland. It is apparent thal, nOlWithstanding the 
PUWP's strenuous endeavors to ensure high levels of 
mobilized and manipulated political involvemenl, Poles are 
shutting out of their lives as much awareness, feeling and 
judgement about political life as possible, although their 
fundamental disaffection remains. 
What is left for the ruling party and the people it rules? 
The PUWP "helped" to generate deep-seated disaffection by 
its own incompetence and corruption, and then used every 
means at its disposal to deflect such disaffection from a path 
leading to dissent Jaruzelski's achievemenl, however, is 
simultaneously his greatest enemy, for the political apathy he 
now confronts means that no one any longer cares enough to 
seek solutions to Poland's crises. Jaruzelski or his successors 
will never be able to resuscitate Poland unless they allow, and 
indeed encourage, individuals to become politically 
efficacious while removing systemic limits that disrupt 
pluralism and collective organizations. Jaruzelski's dilemma, 
and the dilemma of all rulers in Leninist party states, is that 
such actions would again open the path towards political 
dissent even as the causes for disaffection mount. 
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